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ABSTRACT 
 
While some scholars neglect the theological component to William 
James’s ethical views in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life,” Michael Cantrell reads it as promoting a divine command 
theory (DCT) of the foundations of moral obligation.  While 
Cantrell’s interpretation is to be commended for taking God 
seriously, he goes a little too far in the right direction.  Although 
James’s view amounts to what could be called (and what Cantrell 
does call) a DCT because on it God’s demands are necessary and 
sufficient for the highest obligations, this is a view with 
characteristics unusual for a DCT. It only holds for some 
obligations; on it moral obligation does not derive from God’s 
authority; it is not obvious that James believes the God required by 
it even exists; we do not know what God’s demands are; and, 
finally, since we do not know them, we cannot act on them. 
 
__________________ 
 
 
William James’s “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life” (hereafter “MPML”) is a subtle work, and its interpretation 
requires subtlety.  Scholars tend to focus on the text’s relationship 
to utilitarianism, most taking the view that it does not commit 
James to any conventional version of utilitarianism.2  While this 
topic is important, a thorough account of James’s ethics in 
“MPML” requires careful analysis of its theological component, 
which scholars sometimes overlook or even denigrate.3  David E. 
Schrader thinks James’s appeal to religion is “hard to maintain” 
because religion has often been a force for oppression and 
prejudice.4  In a recent edition of William James Studies focusing 
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on “MPML,” Harvey Cormier, Scott F. Aikin, and Robert B. 
Talisse seem to agree on little more than that God must not have 
any significant role in a pragmatic ethic.5 
Yet there remains a strong theological component in 
“MPML.”  Opposite Schrader’s discomfort with religion, Michael 
Cantrell has offered an original interpretation, saying “MPML” 
promotes a kind of divine command theory (hereafter DCT) of the 
foundations of moral obligation.6  Cantrell’s interpretation is a 
useful corrective to the occasional neglect of the vital role of 
religion in James’s ethics, for he takes James seriously when James 
takes God seriously.  Yet Cantrell goes a little too far in the right 
direction, for he overstates God’s role in James’s ethics.  While his 
thesis is largely correct, such DCT as “MPML” uses is heavily 
restricted in fact, knowledge, and practicality.  James promotes a 
sort of DCT regarding some but not all obligations, and DCT is a 
poor description of James’s theory even where it does hold. 
In what follows I shall examine and critique Cantrell’s 
thesis in order to uncover James’s understanding of divine 
commands and their relation to moral obligation and cast new light 
on the religious component of James’s ethics.  In Part I, I shall 
briefly summarize “MPML.”  In moral experience we find a 
multiplicity of demands and moral ideals that only God can 
integrate.  The ideal God promotes is the obligation that overrides 
all others.  As Cantrell says and as I shall explain in Part II, this 
ensures that the command of God is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of this highest possible obligation.  
Although this amounts to a kind of DCT, it is a very unusual one, 
having several features not traditionally associated with DCT.  I 
shall describe these unique parameters of a Jamesian DCT in Parts 
III through V. First, a Jamesian DCT does not hold for some 
genuine obligations.  Second, that God’s moral outlook is binding 
is the source of God’s moral authority, not vice versa.  Third, 
James may not believe that a God who commands these 
obligations exists yet, so there may be no obligation for which 
DCT holds.  Fourth, we have no access to God’s perspective, and 
so the highest possible obligation is unknown to us.  Fifth, to obey 
God’s commands is not the highest obligation we do know and can 
act on; that obligation is simply to find out what God’s commands 
are. These five limitations on a Jamesian DCT fall into three 
categories. The first three limitations are factual, and I shall 
discuss them in Part III; the fourth is a limitation on our knowledge 
of divine commands, and I shall discuss it in Part IV; the fifth is a 
practical limitation of a Jamesian DCT, and I shall discuss it in 
Part V. These considerations will leave us with a somewhat 
dubious link between James and DCT.  Therefore, in Part VI, I 
shall attempt to bring things to an orderly conclusion, first by 
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suggesting a more detailed definition of DCT which excludes 
James’s position and clarifies the differences between it and 
traditional DCTs; and, second, by remarking on the prospects for 
Jamesian support for a more traditional DCT. 
 
I. OUR MORAL LIFE 
 
For James morality is grounded in subjectivity.  Any person 
with his own perspective and desires grounds a moral fact; what a 
person feels is good is, simply because he feels it, good.  If that 
person should desire something of another person, the desiring is a 
demand which constitutes a moral obligation for that other person.  
The demand of a subject is necessary and sufficient for moral 
qualities to exist in the universe.  It is necessary because “no world 
composed of merely physical facts can possibly be a world to 
which ethical propositions apply”; moral qualities only exist in “a 
mind which feels them.”7  While the world is not limited to mere 
physical facts,8 James resists Platonizing abstractions as well as 
materialistic reductionism.  A lifeless supernatural entity cannot 
ground morality; even if ultimate obligation is rooted in a divine 
being, it is that being’s perspective and wishes that give its moral 
demands their legitimacy.  In short, “nothing can be good or right 
except so far as some consciousness feels it to be good or thinks it 
to be right.”9  The demand and wishes of any subject are also 
sufficient to ground a moral obligation: “Take any demand, 
however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make.  
Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied?”10  We are 
obligated to satisfy the demand of any sentient being. 
Unfortunately, different people have different wishes, and 
so there are different ideals.  We have different conceptions of the 
best world.  A myriad of demands cry out for satisfaction.  Thus 
there are a plurality of ideals to be realized, and a plurality of 
oughts.  This presents a challenge for the moral philosopher, whose 
goal is to provide “an account of the moral relations that obtain 
among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable 
system, and make of the world what one may call a genuine 
universe from the ethical point of view.”11  The moral philosopher 
needs to see the moral world as consistent and unified, to behold a 
coherent moral universe.  This seems an insurmountable challenge 
since our demands are distinct and sometimes conflict.  When one 
politician wants virtually unrestricted access to abortion and 
another wants abortion all but abolished, it is difficult to imagine a 
solution mutually palatable.  Again, one philosopher may think all 
human beings should be treated equally as ends in themselves, 
while another may think educated Greek males superior. 
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How can we achieve a coherent moral universe when 
conflicting goals have equal status?  A coherent system of moral 
obligations would make possible a maximum satisfaction of 
demands.  For among all possible ideals there is a set of ideals that 
is the largest set of mutually consistent, and hence concurrently 
satisfiable, ideals.  The task of the moral philosopher is to identify 
that set of ideals, the set of ideals which the most number of people 
either do, or could, desire to see satisfied. 
Only divine wisdom could know what this set of ideals is; 
only God is able to know which ideals among all our competing 
ideals are a part of this moral system; so only God is able to desire 
this set of ideals; so God is necessary for this set of possible ideals 
to be actually desired.  These are the ideals of God.  If God exists, 
he wants us to satisfy this maximal set of consistent ideals, and our 
obligation to do what God wants overrides all others.  Hence 
positing the existence of this set of ideals is tantamount to positing 
the existence of God, who alone can know what the maximal set of 
mutually satisfiable ideals is.  For the present, since this set of 
ideals is not that which is currently sought by sentient creatures, 
God desires that we sentient creatures learn to seek them, that our 
imperfect world may eventually become that best possible world in 
which this set of ideals is satisfied.  Such a world contains the only 
coherent moral universe, the one which the moral philosopher 
strives to achieve. 
For this reason the moral philosopher must take a keen 
interest in God and “pray for the victory of the religious cause.”12  
For he must seek a coherent set of moral principles; to seek it he 
must believe that it exists and can be discovered; he must therefore 
believe that God exists. 
 
II. A DIVINE COMMAND THEORY? 
  
Cantrell observes that “MPML” promotes a kind of DCT.  Cantrell 
lists four components of a divine command theory: first, that 
divine commands be sufficient for moral obligation; second, that 
they be necessary for moral obligation; third, that there be moral 
obligations which override all others; and, fourth, that they be 
objective “in the sense that we humans can be mistaken about 
them.”13  It is clear that James’s theory meets the first, third, and 
fourth conditions.  Divine commands are sufficient for the highest 
obligation because it is God’s perspective and desire that make 
maximal obligation possible; the set of maximally realizable 
ideals, by definition, overrules all others; and it possible for us to 
err by seeking to realize lesser ideals. 
But divine commands are also necessary for the maximal 
set of mutually satisfiable ideals.  God’s demand that this set of 
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ideals be satisfied is necessary to make this exact set of ideals an 
obligation for us; without God, there simply cannot be a set of 
ideals so comprehensive.  So God’s perspective is necessary and 
sufficient for maximal obligation; in this sense, James does have a 
kind of DCT as regards one component of moral reality, namely 
maximal obligation, those highest obligations that override all 
others. 
Of course, we are not necessarily talking about explicit 
commands when we say “commands.”  We do not have to know 
what God’s commands are in order for them to exist.14  DCT, in its 
generic form, does not require this, though some versions of DCT 
may posit explicit commands from God. 
 Cantrell does well to identify a connection between DCT 
and James’s metaethics, correcting the God-resistant tendency in 
some scholarship.  He has also uncovered a Jamesian reason to 
believe in God which others have missed.  Todd Lekan analyzes 
three reasons in “MPML” for believing in God, rejecting two as 
unconvincing and accepting the third only in some cases 15  
Cantrell shows there is another reason: That the moral philosopher 
as such must believe in God in order to believe in the possibility of 
a genuine moral universe and work towards understanding it.16 
Cantrell also avoids the subtle misunderstanding of D. 
Micah Hester, who attributes the highest ethical status to any 
desire that does not seem to conflict with any other.17  This is 
clearly not what James has in mind; the highest ethical status is 
that of obligations which override all others, not those which 
merely do not appear to conflict.  Such obligations are the demands 
of God. 
In short, Cantrell does well to take God seriously in 
interpreting James, but perhaps he takes God a little too seriously, 
for there are significant limitations of the Jamesian DCT.  In the 
next three sections I shall explain these limitations, and in light of 
them I shall, in the final section, propose a definition of DCT 
which clarifies the differences between James’s view and 
traditional DCTs. 
 
III. FACTUAL LIMITATIONS ON THE JAMESIAN DCT 
 
Such DCT as James promotes is limited in fact, for the 
moral facts of the universe, the metaethical realities James 
describes, are poorly captured by DCT.  First, DCT fails to account 
for the vast majority of genuine obligations.  Second, DCT fails to 
describe the source of obligation, which, even for the highest of 
obligations, is not God.  Third, there is a good chance that these 
obligations do not yet exist for the reason that a God who demands 
them does not yet exist!  I am not saying that Cantrell’s contention 
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that James has a DCT is incorrect.  DCT, as Cantrell defines it, is 
an accurate description of a real or possible component of moral 
reality as described by James.  But it is an inadequate description. 
 
A. DCT Only Holds for Some Obligations 
 
First, although Cantrell’s criteria for DCT properly describe 
James’s view of the conditions for a very important class of moral 
obligations (the most important, in fact), they make up a tiny 
minority of moral obligations.  God’s perspective and wish are 
necessary and sufficient only for those obligations that override all 
others; for the demand of any person is sufficient for moral, but 
non-maximal, obligation.  Each of these myriad obligations is 
binding on us.  Of course, they often conflict; each moral agent is 
morally required to both perform and not perform certain actions.  
To perform one duty is to neglect another; yet each is obligatory, 
so we neglect our duty either way.  The moral philosopher must 
hope that God can lead us out of this tangle of obligations, and the 
moral agent may hope to one day learn which obligations are best 
obeyed and which best flouted.  Until then, however, we moral 
agents are guilty of breaking moral laws which have a lesser, but 
nevertheless moral, force. 
 
B. DCT Does Not Describe the Source of Even the Highest 
Obligation 
 
Second, on a typical DCT, the source of moral obligation 
would be God, but this is not what we find in James.  Thus DCT 
poorly captures James’s understanding of the metaethical 
grounding of obligation, which is the subjective preference of all 
sentient beings, not of God as such. 
We have seen that this is true of lesser obligations.  Yet 
even the highest obligations do not derive their overriding status 
from God, but from the fact that they do the best job of reconciling 
the subjective preferences of all sentient beings.  God’s desiring 
certain ideals is a necessary and sufficient condition for their being 
the highest of obligations; but God desires them because they are 
good, not vice versa.  That they override all other obligations does 
not derive from God’s preferring them, but from their ability to 
reconcile a maximal amount of these other obligations.  Cantrell is, 
thus, mistaken when he comments on these words of James: 
 
If there be such a [divine] consciousness, then its 
demands carry the most of obligation simply 
because they are the greatest in amount. But it is 
even then not abstractly right that we should respect 
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them. It is only concretely right--or right after the 
fact, and by virtue of the fact, that they are actually 
made.18 
Cantrell contrasts the two sides of a version of Plato’s ancient 
Euthyphro dilemma: “does God command what is right because it 
is (antecedently) right, or is what is right right because God 
commands it?”19  He concludes that James’s view is the latter.20  
But this is not so.  The Euthyphro dilemma Cantrell has in mind 
would contrast two conceptions of obligation, the idea that 
obligations are binding independently of God’s authority and the 
idea that obligations are binding because of God’s authority.  
James is not considering this contrast, but another: between, on the 
one hand, the idea that divine commands are binding in the 
abstract, independent of the divine personality; and, on the other 
hand, that divine commands are binding as a result of their 
grounding in personal desires.  God’s wishes carry weight because 
God is “a living personal God.”21  Dispensing with the abstract 
theory of the origins of divine commands does not mean that they 
are only binding because God wills them.  On the contrary: God’s 
demands overrule others “simply because they are the greatest in 
amount.”  In other words, that these obligations override all others 
is a result of the fact that they are the best possible set of binding 
obligations independently of God.  God commands them because 
they are right.  His command activates what would otherwise be 
merely possible obligations, giving them a moral force; however, 
their ability to override all other obligations is not a result of the 
divine command, willed by God from above.  The ability of the 
divine commands to override all other obligations is built from the 
ground up, a result of the myriad obliging wishes that unite in the 
divine wish.22 
In short, James denies an abstract moral order, saying 
instead that moral order is essentially personal.  In doing so he 
does not attribute to God the privilege of a moral authority 
qualitatively different from that of any other person; the difference 
is quantitative.  God is no moral legislator for the universe.  God is 
more like an executive for moral legislation.  The legislature 
consisting of all sentient beings below sends to his divine desk a 
huge, disorganized pile of laws.  He proceeds to ratify the most 
comprehensive moral order than can possibly be made out of 
them—but he vetoes the handful that cannot be integrated. 
Thus, God does not command and create obligation out of 
his own authority.  Rather, God discovers that set of obligations 
which would, on its own merits, be sublime; through loving it, he 
wishes into existence the obligation that we work to make the 
world satisfying it a reality.  Indeed, a better word for the divine 
commands might be “wishes” or “desires,” for the word 
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“command” connotes authority, and on James’s view God simply 
does not make things right by virtue of his infinite authority. 
This, by the way, allows us to return to Schrader’s concern 
with James’s appeal to religion.  Schrader notes that religion has 
often been mixed with prejudice, saying that “People are 
notoriously prone to imputing their own blindness and deafness to 
God as well.”23  Schrader fails to engage James’s own reason for 
appealing to God, which specifically precludes any attempt to 
harness God to the narrow agenda of any single ideal.  James’s 
idea of God is the idea of the God who cares more about all our 
ideals than the most loving of human beings is able. 
 
C. DCT May Not Obtain of Any Actual Obligations 
 
 Third, God, who wishes for a world that satisfies 
maximally consistent obligations, may not exist yet; therefore DCT 
may not obtain for any existing obligations, but merely for certain 
possible obligations.  In order to explain this, let us consider two 
plausible interpretations of James’s idea of divinity.  On one of 
these interpretations God does not yet exist, for which reason 
maximal obligations do not exist and DCT does not hold in the real 
world.  I will not try to give a comprehensive summary of the 
possible interpretations of James’s view of God, nor to determine 
which is the correct interpretation.  I only aim to show that it 
matters what sort of God we are talking about. 
It is hard to tell what kind of God James believes in—or, 
rather, which divine realities are worthy of being called “God.”  
After outlining two such notions of the divine in James’s thought, I 
will comment on the implications of this ambiguity for DCT in 
James.  For the character of God determines whether God is able to 
issue divine commands, thus grounding the highest obligations. 
So what kind of God might James believe in?  On the one 
hand, there is the idea of a finite God, a God who is the central 
character in what I like to call Almost Classical Theism (ACT).  
Despite staying close to classical theism in several respects, ACT 
is not bound to the specific content of any religious scriptures; it is 
at best uninterested in the simplicity of God; although God is all-
knowing or near enough,24 it concedes that God cannot be both all-
knowing and all-powerful at the same time;25 it insists that God 
interacts closely with the world to achieve his ends;26 and, at this 
latter point, implicitly gives up the notion of God’s timelessness 
and impassibility.  Still, as concerns the relationship of God and 
obligation, ACT is pretty traditional: God exists, is entirely good, 
and currently has the best perspective on the moral universe; he 
already knows what a unity of ideals looks like, and, in wishing 
that a world satisfying it come to be, has already created the 
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coherent set of moral obligations for which the moral philosopher 
longs.  Accordingly, maximal obligation is presently binding on 
us; we just don’t know what it is, and for the time being we have 
the duty of finding out.  God’s orders precede our moral activity in 
order of time and priority: God’s requirements are issued before 
we have a chance to act on them; and our deeds are moral to the 
degree they measure up to God’s standards. 
 On the other hand, James might endorse what I call 
Extreme Process Theology (EPT), the belief that God is still in the 
making.  God simply is the eventual stability of ideals, or in 
Dewey’s words God is “the union of all ideal ends.”27  On EPT, a 
stability of ideals has yet to be achieved, even in theory.  Since we 
have yet to achieve the unity of ideals a complete God has yet to 
emerge.  In fact, the moral philosopher has a hand in the 
construction of God. 
 To further distinguish ACT from EPT, consider James’s 
most dramatic example of the necessity of belief.  When I have to 
jump across a huge chasm to save my life, my belief that I can 
make the jump will help me to succeed; this belief is a factor in, 
and condition for, its own truth.28  It interacts with its own object, 
effecting a new alignment between belief and world by changing 
the latter to fit the former.  What if, as James suggests in “The Will 
to Believe,” religious belief also interacts with its own object?29  
On ACT, since God already exists, he has only to shape a world of 
maximal ideal satisfaction—to realize the happy eschatological 
state.  Belief in God interacts with its eschatological component; 
the belief that the eschaton is on its way, that God exists and will 
ultimately triumph, helps to assure that ultimate triumph.30  But on 
EPT religious belief interacts with its object on a much grander 
scale; it helps to ensure God’s existence and to shape his ultimate 
character, not merely guaranty his triumph over evil; for the 
process of achieving the best possible world shapes the ideals that 
are identified with God.  It is not just that we don’t yet know what 
the ideals (or God) will look like; our interaction with them helps 
to determine what they will ultimately look like.31 
 Although I think the idea of God at play in “MPML” is 
probably closer to ACT than to EPT, I will not argue this here.  My 
point is simply that EPT is a plausible reading of James’s theology 
in “MPML”; and, since it is plausible that James holds to EPT, it is 
possible that the divine commands which constitute maximal 
obligations do not exist yet. 
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE 
COMMANDS 
 
We must now turn to the epistemic limitations of the 
Jamesian DCT; following that we will explore the concomitant 
practical limitations.  Cantrell acknowledges the epistemic and the 
practical limitations, observing that “God’s thoughts are hidden 
from us” and that a DCT “fails as a measure of conduct.”32  I 
explore these limitations for two reasons, one of which is simply to 
be thorough in uncovering the limitations of the Jamesian DCT.  
The other, more important reason is to let James’s outlook speak 
for itself.  As we shall see when all is said and done, James’s 
underlying Pragmatism speaks strongly against the propriety of 
using the language of DCT to describe his view.  After explaining 
the epistemic limitations of the Jamesian DCT in this section, in 
the next section I shall explain the practical limitations; at the end 
of the next section I shall explain why Cantrell’s acknowledgement 
of these limitations does not go far enough. 
On the Jamesian DCT, we have no knowledge of the divine 
commands.  Even if there is a God somewhere wishing certain 
highest obligations on us, we do not know what they are; “exactly 
what the thought of the infinite thinker may be is hidden from us 
even were we sure of his existence.”33  We simply don’t have 
access to God’s perspective.  In time, we can at least approximate 
knowledge of it; the moral philosopher can hope to eventually 
approach an understanding of this set of ideals.  Understanding 
what this set of ideals is will take some doing.  Since ideals are 
rooted in subjective perspectives, the largest set of mutually 
consistent ideals exists in a world containing the largest set of 
mutually consistent personal demands.  As things stand now, too 
many people have too many irreconcilable demands.  Accordingly, 
the highest obligation which is known to us is not to obey the 
divine commands, but to discover them.34 
It will take a little time to figure out how to satisfy the most 
number of ideals.  It will also take political action.  The moral 
philosopher is also the political philosopher.35  He begins with the 
ideals that exist in human society (those of Republicans and 
Democrats, of libertarians and socialists, of Kant, Aristotle, and 
Mill) and tries to reconcile them in practice as much as in theory.  
The philosopher and his community will have to work together.  
Since it is unclear how to reconcile some of the distinct ideals that 
can be realized simultaneously, political and philosophical practice 
will take a great deal of creativity.  Also, some ideals will have to 
be sacrificed in order for the most ideals to be realized.  Most 
importantly, in the process the moral philosopher and the rest of us 
will have to learn to tolerate and embrace the demands of others as 
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much as possible, to make the ideals of others our own.36  In this 
respect our ideals will come to resemble the ideals of God, whose 
ideal is precisely that the greatest possible harmony of ideals 
comes to be.37 
This, by the way, solves a problem scholars have raised 
with James’s ethics.  Aikin and Talisse lament the supposed 
absence of an ideal of tolerance in James.  They fear the 
consequences of validating contradictory obligations, especially 
the obligations forged from ideals that are based in the desire to 
dominate or destroy others.38  Talisse and Aikin fail to see how 
God brings about the very tolerance they seek.  On James’s view, 
God’s ideals are precisely those that best tolerate and reconcile the 
ideals of others.39  The process of reconciling our competing ideals 
will, as James says,40 necessarily involve eliminating some ideals.  
Every person’s ideal is an obligation, but not every obligation is 
overriding.  The ideals of the Nazis, for example, are technically 
obligations on James’s scheme; but they conflict with the ideals of 
the rest of us, not to mention the ideals of their victims; 
accordingly, they would be among the very first ideals to go.41  We 
need not even wait for clarity from God on this point; that Nazi 
ideals must be eliminated to form a moral universe should be clear 
to any moral philosopher worth his salt. 
While this may sound like a version of utilitarianism, it is at 
least not a typical one.  James’s strategy is to satisfy the greatest 
possible number of demands, but this is no ordinary utilitarianism: 
Demands ought to be satisfied only because they ground ideals.  
Classical utilitarianism itself is wedded to a certain ideal, the ideal 
that happiness or pleasure is the greatest good.  Utilitarianism 
proper would sacrifice some desires so that others can be satisfied 
because that would bring the most pleasure and so maximize its 
own ideal.  James’s philosophy would sacrifice some desires on 
behalf of others in order to maximize the satisfaction of ideals.  If 
James’s philosophy is utilitarianism, then, I think it is a 
utilitarianism of ideals; it seeks the satisfaction of as many ideals 
as possible, not the satisfaction of the ideal sought by 
utilitarianism.42 
In sum, divine commands, while necessary and sufficient to 
ground maximal obligation, are unknown to us even if they do 
exist.  So the Jamesian DCT, though it correctly describes these 
highest of obligations, fails to describe any obligations we human 
beings know about.  It is a theory of the conditions for sublime, yet 
unknown, moral principles.  In the next section I will explain why 
this epistemic limitation of the DCT leads to a serious practical 
limitation. 
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V. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF A JAMESIAN DCT 
 
We have already seen how DCT is a poor, though an 
accurate, description of some of the ethical realities James 
discusses.  But what really matters to James is not simply the 
accuracy of a theory in describing some component of reality.  
James is a Pragmatist; what matters to him is the difference a 
moral theory makes in practice.  The Jamesian DCT is only a part 
of James’s overall moral theory, a part which is useful as an 
inspiration, but nevertheless fails to describe anything useful since 
the moral obligations to which it applies are unknown to us. 
According to James’s moral theory as a whole, we must 
mediate between competing ideals in order to achieve a world in 
which the most ideals can be satisfied.  We must learn about divine 
commands so as to enact them.  The process of learning them is no 
less than the common ethics of an entire society (if not the world); 
there is enough work to keep moral philosophers and politicians 
busy for several lifetimes devising and implementing common 
solutions to diverging ideals.  This is all very practical; however, 
our present ignorance of divine commands ensures that they 
themselves are useless.  In other words, while the Jamesian idea of 
moral obligation is useful, the portion of it which describes the 
highest obligations, and which I have been calling a DCT, fails to 
announce any of these obligations to us, and so these obligations 
remain useless. 
Even the portion of James’s moral theory which can be 
called a DCT is only useful as an inspiration.  While DCT is 
technically true of some real or possible component of moral 
reality as James understands it, we cannot act on the overriding 
obligations wished by God.  We can only work towards 
understanding them.  Those divine commands which shimmer 
beyond the veil of our ignorance do not give us practical rules for 
moral practice, but inspire us to discover the best rules for moral 
practice.  The obligations explained by the DCT are useless, but 
not the supremely useful dream of learning what they are.  The 
Jamesian DCT inspires us to find what is good without telling us 
what is good.  So the theory itself is useful; but that of which it is a 
theory, supreme moral obligation, is useless to us.  The divine 
wishes do nothing to guide future experience, solve no concrete 
problems, and fail to direct the moral philosopher or the politician.  
The idea of the divine wishes has value in experience as an 
inspiration that we strive to realize the divine wishes. 
This is why James says that “our postulation of him after 
all serves only to let loose in us the strenuous mood.”43  It is not 
that God is in fact only an inspiration to our vigorous pursuit of a 
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moral universe; Cantrell is quite right that the living God, if there 
is one, matters to James, as the supporter of the highest 
obligations.44  Nevertheless, our idea of God, held in ignorance of 
the divine fact that may (or may not) presently be out there, is only 
an inspiration.  For James the truth lies somewhere between 
Cantrell’s view and that espoused by Deborah Boyle: “What 
matters for James is not whether God actually exists, but whether 
we believe that God exists.”45  Boyle’s is an apt description of 
God’s immediate relevance to known obligation, as long as we 
remain ignorant of the divine wishes.  However, as Cantrell says, 
the actual existence of God matters a great deal, albeit in the long 
term. 
This amounts to a serious objection to the propriety of 
using DCT to describe James’s views.  He is pragmatic to the core.  
What is useless has no value.  The unknown obligations described 
by the Jamesian DCT are useless to us.  The DCT itself is useful, 
but less so than the overall moral theory of which it is only a part 
and which does succeed in giving moral rules to guide practice.  
Pragmatically, then, DCT as Cantrell defines it succeeds in being 
an accurate description of a portion of James’s moral theory, but a 
inadequate description of that portion and of the moral theory as a 
whole. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY 
AND WILLIAM JAMES 
 
The proponent of DCT may find James’s theory an 
attenuated version of DCT, hardly worthy of the name.  Although 
DCT and James’s metaethics have much in common, the five 
differences I have articulated hold the two views rather far apart.  I 
shall conclude, first, by suggesting a better definition of DCT 
which distinguishes the views.  Then I shall show how some of 
James’s ideas could support a more traditional DCT.  For DCT and 
James’s ideas, if not quite the same, are nonetheless related ideas 
with significant connections. 
James’s ideas call for a reexamination of what constitutes 
DCT. Cantrell suggests that a DCT has four parts: divine 
commands are necessary for moral obligations, they are sufficient, 
there are moral obligations which override all others, and these 
overriding obligations are objective such that we can be mistaken 
about them.  As we have seen, this definition of DCT correctly 
describes one component of moral reality as James understands it.  
But as we have also seen, it describes only one small component; it 
also fails to describe the ultimate source of obligation even in that 
component, which may exist only in possibility and not in reality, 
which is unknown to us even if it does exist, and which fails to 
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give us any practical ethical guidance.  The last of these problems 
is the deepest for the Jamesian, but the second is the deepest for the 
proponent of a traditional DCT.  On a robust DCT God’s wish 
should be the source of the highest moral obligation, not just a 
truth condition for it. 
What shall we conclude, then, with respect to William 
James and the divine command theory?  We could, as I have done 
so far in this article, call James’s theory a DCT, albeit an unusual 
one with theoretical and practical limitations.  However, I think it 
would be better to refine Cantrell’s definition of DCT by adding a 
fifth part to his definition: that divine authority be the only possible 
ground of obligations, that the highest moral obligations have no 
source of moral authority save the God who commands them.  
Better yet, we can simply replace the first two parts of Cantrell’s 
definition, for this fifth part entails the first two; for, if divine 
authority is the only possible source of moral obligation, then it is 
both necessary and sufficient for moral obligation.  So, though 
Cantrell’s definition of DCT describes a component of James’s 
view of moral reality, I think a better definition of DCT will not 
describe James’s view. 
However, his theory is a sort of corollary to a more 
traditional DCT, and shares key elements with it.  With this in 
mind, I shall now suggest a quasi-Jamesian strategy for promoting 
a more traditional DCT.  We must make a distinction between a 
raw examination of experience and what James calls in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience “over-beliefs,” those beliefs that 
are abstracted from experience.46  James prefers his over-beliefs to 
extrapolate as little as possible from experience.47  But a proponent 
of DCT may have different preferences.  He is free to accept 
James’s moral intuition that, all else being equal, the demand of 
any person “ought . . . , for its own sole sake, to be satisfied” and 
to agree with James that there is a desperate need for divine help in 
piecing together a moral universe.  But he is also free to insert his 
own over-beliefs to the effect that God already exists, has already 
constructed the moral universe, and has subordinated the ideals of 
some creatures to his own, by his authority making them non-
moral obligations.  Although a theory of this sort goes beyond a 
mere analysis of James’s thought, I see no reason why James’s 
ideas could not be developed in this manner. 
I have tried to keep my own views from getting in the way 
of articulating what I think James is saying and determining how 
DCT interacts with his thought.  I close, however, by stating my 
opinion on an aspect of James that I think must surely be correct.  
However James thinks of God, and whatever understanding of God 
we may wish to bring to James, the impetus of “MPML” is to learn 
how to, in the phrase attributed to Johannes Kepler, “think God’s 
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thoughts after him.”  We must learn to predicate as morally 
obligatory what God predicates as morally obligatory, desire what 
God desires, and love what God loves.  In short, we must conform 
our minds to the mind of God.  When James recommends this, for 
what little my view is worth, I believe he is correct. 
 
Forman Christian College 
M_Boone@alumni.baylor.edu 
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NOTES 
 
1I wish to thank Michael Cantrell for his insightful and 
provocative essay on “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”; 
Stuart Rosenbaum for teaching me so much about William James and for 
encouraging me to respond to Cantrell’s thesis; and my student worker at 
Berry College, Haley Athens, for reading through an earlier draft of this 
essay. 
2 Graham H. Bird says James sees inadequacies in several major 
ethical theories, including utilitarianism; Ruth Anna Putnam describes 
James as “a consequentialist,” but “not a hedonist, nor any other kind of 
reductive utilitarian”; David E. Schrader points out that James himself 
dismisses his connection with utilitarianism as trivial; Scott F. Aikin and 
Robert B. Talisse say James rejects utilitarianism both for its hedonism 
and for its thesis that “all goods are commensurable”; and Robert J. 
O’Connell thinks James’s ethics manifest “a deontological streak.”  On 
the other hand, Michael R. Slater identifies “MPML” as promoting “a 
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version of utilitarianism.”  Richard Gale analyzes James’s view as a 
version of desire-satisfaction utilitarianism.  Recently, Wesley Cooper 
objects to Gale, describing James’s view as “an ideal-maximizing 
consensualism.” 
Graham H. Bird, “Moral Philosophy and the Development of 
Morality” in The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. Ruth 
Anna Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 261-262.  
Ruth Anna Putnam, “Some of Life’s Ideals” in The Cambridge 
Companion to William James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 285.  David E. Schrader, 
“Simonizing James: Taking Demand Seriously,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Pierce Society 34.4 (Fall 1998), 1014.  Scott F. Aikin and 
Robert B. Talisse, “Three Challenges to Jamesian Ethics,” William 
James Studies 6 (2011).  O’Connell, William James on the Courage to 
Believe (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 1997) and “‘The Will to 
Believe’ and James’ ‘Deontological Streak’,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Pierce Society 28.4 (Fall 1992), especially pages 816-22.  
Slater, William James on Ethics and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 70.  Gale, The Divided Selves of William James 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 2.  Cooper, The 
Unity of William James’s Thought (Nashville: Vanderbilt University 
Press, 2002), chapter 12, especially page 225. 
3Three studies which do investigate the religious aspect of 
“MPML” are Todd Lekan, “Strenuous Moral Living,” William James 
Studies 2.1 (2007); Michael R. Slater, “Ethical Naturalism and Religious 
Belief in ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’,” William James 
Studies 2.1 (2007); and Michael Slater, William James on Ethics and 
Faith, chapter 3.  Slater notes that “Very few interpreters . . . have dealt 
with the religious aspect” of “MPML” (William James on Ethics and 
Faith), 70-71. 
4 Schrader, 1025-1026. 
5 Harvey Cormier, “Comment on Talisse and Aikin,” William 
James Studies 6 (2011); Scott F. Aikin and Robert B. Talisse, “Replies to 
Our Critics,” William James Studies 6 (2011). 
6Michael Cantrell, “William James’s Transcendental Theological 
Voluntarism: A Reading of ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life’,” William James Studies 10 (2013). 
7 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” in 
The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, vol. 6 of 
The Works of William James, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson 
Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis; 19 volumes (Cambridge, MA, and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1975-1988), 145.  Hereafter 
“MPML.” 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 147. 
10 Ibid., 149. 
11 Ibid., 141.  Ruth Anna Putnam’s language is slightly 
misleading when she says that “for James morality presupposes that we 
have” made “the ends of others our own.”  The reality of moral standards 
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requires no more than that one sentient being want something from 
another; making others’ ends our own is a requirement for something 
grander than mere morality, namely the establishment of a moral 
universe, a coherent system of morals.  Putnam, “Some of Life’s Ideals,” 
284. 
12 “MPML,” 161. 
13 Cantrell, 2. 
14 Ibid., 8. 
15 “Strenuous Moral Living.” 
16 On this see Slater, “Ethical Naturalism and Religious Belief,” 
42-4. 
17 D. Micah Hester, “The Possibility for Tragic Obligations” in 
Streams of William James 1.3 (Winter 2000, 15). 
18 “MPML,” 149. 
19 Cantrell, 5. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “MPML,” 149. 
22 Also consider: “ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a 
universe where the highest consciousness is human, as in a universe 
where there is a God as well” (“MPML,” 150).  The highest of 
obligations grow out of these myriad lesser obligations, deriving their 
overriding character from the fact that they are the best possible 
integration of them.  I think James’s later view as Gale describes it—“it 
is because God’s demands and desires are good that we are obligated to 
comply with them”—is at least implicit in “MPML” (Gale, 44).  Also 
Cooper: “Without roots in human motivation, a theistic moral code 
would have no moral weight” (235).  Also Slater: God’s values are not 
“intrinsically good or right”; God’s “ideal moral universe would be the 
maximally inclusive one” (William James on Ethics and Faith, 90). 
23 Schrader, 1025. 
24 “MPML” describes God as “the infinite thinker” (161). 
25 William James, A Pluralistic Universe, vol. 4 of The Works of 
William James ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas 
K. Skrupskelis; 19 volumes (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1975-1988),  141. 
26 Ibid., 56. 
27 John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1934), 42. 
28 William James, “The Sentiment of Rationality” in The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 80.  For a thorough 
examination of James’s understanding of truth, see Hilary Putnam, 
“James’ Theory of Truth” in The Cambridge Companion to William 
James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).  Putnam addresses this aspect of James’s understanding of truth 
on pages 167-171.  
29 “The Will to Believe” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays 
in Popular Philosophy, 31-32.  On the development of James’s idea of 
comprehending the universe under the analogy of social relationships, 
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after a Social Analogy: Intimacy, Panpsychism, and a Finite God in a 
Pluralistic Universe” in The Cambridge Companion to William James, 
ed. Ruth Anna Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
30 This theme also appears in “The Sentiment of Rationality,” 84-
89, and “Is Life Worth Living?,” 53-56, in The Will to Believe and Other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy. 
31 Cooper’s comments help to elucidate this aspect of Jamesian 
religion (6, 20-21, 147-148). 
32 Cantrell, 8. 
33 “MPML,” 161. 
34 Of course, God desires that we find these overriding 
obligations, so to do so is to obey a divine command; but the command 
that we find the highest obligations is not itself the highest obligations. 
35 James: “His function is in fact indistinguishable from that of 
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